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Abstract
Privacy and integrity are important security concerns. These
concerns are addressed by controlling information ﬂow, i.e.,
restricting how information can ﬂow through a system. Most
proposed systems that restrict information ﬂow make the
implicit assumption that the hardware used by the system is
fully “correct” and that the hardware’s instruction set accu-
rately describes its behavior in all circumstances. The truth
is more complicated: modern hardware designs defy com-
plete veriﬁcation; many aspects of the timing and ordering of
events are left totally unspeciﬁed; and implementation bugs
present themselves with surprising frequency. In this work
we describe Sapper, a novel hardware description language
for designing security-critical hardware components. Sapper
seeks to address these problems by using static analysis at
compile-time to automatically insert dynamic checks in the
resulting hardware that provably enforce a given information
ﬂow policy at execution time. We present Sapper’s design
and formal semantics along with a proof sketch of its secu-
rity. In addition, we have implemented a compiler for Sapper
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and used it to create a non-trivial secure embedded processor
with many modern microarchitectural features. We empiri-
cally evaluate the resulting hardware’s area and energy over-
head and compare them with alternative designs.
Categories and Subject Descriptors B.6.3 [Design Aids]:
Hardware Description Languages
Keywords HardwareDescriptionLanguage,Non-interference
1. Introduction
Security has become a ﬁrst-order priority in many sys-
tem designs. High assurance and life-critical systems, such
as aircraft control systems and implantable cardioverter-
deﬁbrillators and also systems used in banking and the mili-
tary, all require strong guarantees about their security prop-
erties. However, designing systems with provably strong
security properties can be extremely challenging and costly;
just assessing the assurance of the resulting system can cost
upwardsof$10,000perlineofcode[3].Ourgoalistoenable
thedesignofprovably-securehardwaresystemssuchthat(1)
the designs are easily expressed by hardware designers, and
(2) the resulting secure systems have low overhead in terms
of chip area, performance, and power consumption.
Information ﬂow security [10] is an important category
of security properties that encompasses conﬁdentiality (con-
ﬁdential information cannot leak into unclassiﬁed chan-
∗TheworkisdonewhenXunLi,MohitTiwariandVasanthRamRajarathi-
nam are graduate students at University of California, Santa Barbara.nels) and integrity (critical system components cannot be
affected or tampered with by untrusted parties). Information
ﬂow control mechanisms associate security labels with the
resources and data contained in a system. A security policy
is speciﬁed by ordering the security labels in a lattice, such
that data with labels higher in the lattice are more restricted
(i.e., can ﬂow to fewer places) than data with labels lower in
the lattice. For example, secret data would be labeled with
a high label, and an unsecured output port would be labeled
with a low label—this policy speciﬁes that the secret data
(or any data directly or indirectly derived from the secret
data) should not be sent on the publically-visible port. The
goal is to ensure that a principal who can observe all data at
some security level ℓ cannot deduce any information about
data at a security level that is higher than or noncomparable
to ℓ. A system that meets this goal is said to enforce non-
interference [11]. Many approaches have been previously
attempted to enforce non-interference at the software or ISA
level, yet the resulting systems are still left vulnerable to
timing channels and bugs in the hardware implementation.
The core of our approach to this problem is a novel
security-aware hardware design synthesis language called
Sapper. The Sapper language is an extension of a synthesiz-
able subset of Verilog; the Sapper compiler translates Sap-
per code into synthesizable Verilog that is guaranteed to
meet a speciﬁed security policy. It does so by automatically
deriving and inserting dynamic security checks into the Ver-
ilog hardware design. The semantics of Sapper ensures that
the security properties of the resulting system are statically
guaranteed, even though these security checks are executed
dynamically. During the generated system’s execution, these
dynamic checks intercept any information ﬂow that vio-
lates the security policy and replaces the offending operation
with one that is guaranteed to be secure (though potentially
changing the intended functionality of the system).
The intended design process makes use of the dynamic
checks in two phases. First, during testing but before fabri-
cation2, these dynamic checks will ensure that security vio-
lations are revealed to the hardware designers as functional-
ity bugs, which the modern design process already has many
techniques for detecting and dealing with. In other words,
Sapper transforms the problem of detecting security viola-
tions during testing (for which there is little support and
experienceinthemoderndesignprocess)intotheproblemof
detecting functionality bugs during testing (for which there
is a great deal of support and experience). Through careful
design iteration, the hardware designers can detect and ﬁx
security problems to ensure that the system will operate as
intended in the vast majority of cases, including all common
cases, even with these dynamic checks in place.
Once testing is complete and the hardware is deployed,
the second function of these checks comes into play, because
2Typically such tests are performed through a combination of hardware
simulation and prototyping on reconﬁgurable hardware.
the checks will remain in the ﬁnal hardware design. The
checks serve as the last line of defense against run-time vio-
lations in conditions never encountered during testing and
veriﬁcation. Both undiscovered hardware bugs and rarely
occurring combinations of events may provide opportunity
to attack an unprotected system. In contrast to this, hardware
designed with Sapper will automatically capture and prevent
any runtime violations.
We describe the design of Sapper and provide a for-
mal semantics and proof sketch of soundness. We demon-
strate the expressiveness of Sapper by implementing a fully-
featured secure embedded processor with a MIPS ISA and
an array of modern microarchitectural features; the proces-
sor is complete enough to run real-world benchmarks. We
empirically evaluate the overhead of the system generated
by Sapper and show that it has only a 4% hardware overhead
and no performance loss compared to an insecure baseline
version of the same processor.
2. Background
There are many ways in which a hardware/software system
might be compromised. We begin by describing our spe-
ciﬁc threat model and assumptions, and then present related
work.
2.1 Threat Model
Sapper focuses speciﬁcally on the information-ﬂow policy
of noninterference.3 In this work we do not consider other
security properties of hardware systems.
For our purposes, a system consists of a set of input ports,
a set of output ports, a hardware implementation, and an
initial conﬁguration. The input and output ports are assumed
to have a set of security labels (for example, a set of high
input “pins” and a set of low input “pins”, which may be
separate physical components or time multiplexed on the
same physical component). An information ﬂow policy is
speciﬁed as a lattice over those labels. Sapper can enforce
policies speciﬁed by any ﬁnite security lattice. For clarity,
the discussion in the following sections assumes a simple
security lattice with two labels high and low such that low <
high. We evaluate the effect of a more complex security
lattice in Section 4. We assume that the initial conﬁguration
of the machine is labeled conservatively (i.e., no high state is
labeled as low). This initial conﬁguration may include both
high and low bits, and those bits may represent anything
from executable code, to initial memory states, to the start
states for various microarchitectural state machines.
The attacker is assumed to have complete control over
(1) all low inputs to the device; and (2) all of the bits in the
initial state labeled as low. The ﬁrst assumption models an
3Noninterference is perhaps too strong a property for general purpose sys-
tems, but is useful both in the context of crypto systems and safety critical
designs and matches closely with the existing design goals expressed by
both Intel [7] and ARM [6].active attacker. The second assumption models any way in
which an attacker might take advantage of access to low data
used by the system, including but not limited to malicious
or compromised software running on the system. We do
not assign intent to the hardware; it simply transforms the
state of the system as directed by the hardware design and
(after our modiﬁcations) subject to the security policy. We
assume that hardware is fabricated as speciﬁed by our tools,
and we do not attempt to address the trusted fabrication
problem [5, 13, 35, 36], although we do not assume that the
hardware has been designed correctly or securely.
Using Sapper, we create hardware that ensures the data
ﬂowing to any output port conforms to the information ﬂow
policy speciﬁed by a security lattice given at design time,
e.g., that no untrusted information contaminates a trusted
port, and no secret information leaks to a non-secret port.
This threat model includes both explicit and implicit infor-
mation ﬂows, timing and storage channels, and any other
digital form of information ﬂow, but does not include the
use of physical or analog phenomena such as EM emission,
temperature, or power draw. A system is said to be strictly
enforcingapolicyifitcanbeshownthatthepolicycannever
be violated regardless of the actions of the attacker subject
to this model.
2.2 Related Work
Denning and Denning are one of the ﬁrst to show how
programming language techniques and static analysis can
be used to enforce information ﬂow policies [10]. This
approach was later formalized by Volpano [34] and sub-
sequently implemented as various language extensions [20,
27]. A more comprehensive study of programming language
techniques related to information ﬂow security can be found
in the survey by Sabelfeld and Myers [25].
While language level techniques provide strong guaran-
tees inside application implementations, security enforce-
ment between applications relies on an underlying operating
system. Here too there are many related approaches [14, 16,
17, 24, 28, 39]. Security mechanisms at the OS level cannot
provide full hardware/software system security guarantees
in the face of adversaries that take advantage of information
leakage in the underlying hardware implementation, such
as through caches [23] and branch predictors [4]. Speciﬁc
secure hardware component designs have been proposed to
defend against existing covert channel attacks [32, 37, 38].
Moresystematicapproacheshavealsobeenproposedtocon-
trol hardware timing channels through software/hardware
contracts [40], quantitative measurements [9], or fuzzing
mechanisms [19]. Designing a hardware Trusted Comput-
ing Base (TCB) with minimum complexity while provid-
ing strong security guarantees is also an active research
area [22, 33, 41].
Towards this end, various approaches have been pro-
posed in previous work towards analyzing and enforcing
information ﬂow security in hardware designs, including
Gate Level Information Flow Tracking (GLIFT) [31] (and
its extension Star Logic [30]) and Caisson [18]. While these
past approaches represent a ﬁrst generation of secure hard-
ware design languages, both the expressiveness of those lan-
guages (the class of hardware systems that could be shown
to be secure) and the efﬁciency of their implementations
(the amount of extra logic required to perform checks) can
be prohibitively poor.
GLIFT tracks every single bit of information in the sys-
tem through each logic gate. Every bit in the system is
associated with a shadow bit to represent its security label,
and for every logic gate, a shadow logic circuit is used
to calculate the output’s security level. The values of the
gate’s inputs are used to achieve precise tracking, e.g. when
a low input of an AND gate is known to be 0, the out-
put should be labeled as low even the other input can be
high. This feature is extremely important for implementing
a practical system in which trusted and untrusted compo-
nents can be securely multiplexed [29]. Despite GLIFT’s
pure dynamic nature, the tracking technique is guaranteed
to be complete, i.e. it covers both implicit ﬂows and tim-
ing channels, since all forms of information ﬂow become
explicit at the gate level. Note that GLIFT itself does not
provide any enforcement mechanism, but rather works as
a foundation for information ﬂow tracking. Later work on
Execution Leases [29] builds upon GLIFT and enforces non-
interference (by construction) through memory and timing
boundaries. To reduce the substantial overhead of GLIFT,
the authors reworked their method as a static analysis in the
form of Star Logic [30]. As a veriﬁcation tool, Star Logic
takes a given hardware design, augments it with GLIFT
tracking logic, loads a given piece of trusted computing base
(e.g., the system kernel) and uses abstract interpretation to
explore the execution space and detect potential violations.
The tracking logic is removed from the ﬁnal design before
fabrication. It is important to see that Star Logic does not
provide assistance to or early feedback for hardware design-
ers attempting to create secure hardware; instead it allows
for the after-the-fact static veriﬁcation of a coordinated pro-
cessor and kernel design, which is not the same problem that
Sapper is solving. Hence throughout this work, references to
GLIFT are regarding the dynamic tracking technique origi-
nally shown by Tiwari et al. [29, 31] and not with reference
to Star Logic.
Caisson is another attempt to use programming language
techniques to enable secure hardware design [18]. Caisson
takes techniques from information ﬂow security type sys-
tems at the programming language level and applies them
at the hardware level. The Caisson language syntax is very
similar to that of Sapper, and in fact Sapper borrows the con-
cept of nested states from Caisson. However, since Caisson
uses a purely static type system, all registers must be dupli-
cated for different security levels and multiplexers are used
to choose the corresponding register based on the currentsecurity context. The advantage of this approach is that (1)
there is no runtime overhead due to the storage or manip-
ulation of labels as labels are never tracked during execu-
tion; and (2) the programmer need never worry about the
effects of a security violation because, by construction, there
can never be one. It does come with two big problems how-
ever: (1) statically typing everything requires that resources
be hard-partitioned or even duplicated, and then multiplexed
at runtime, resulting in large area overheads; and (2) there is
no way for the system to ever examine, react to, or affect the
ﬂow of program metadata (a.k.a. labels). Labels are strictly
a concept used for analysis, and have no physical manifesta-
tion in the ﬁnal design.
3. The Sapper Language
We propose Sapper, a hardware description language that
enforces noninterference security policies through statically-
insertedlogicfordynamictrackingandenforcement.Instead
of enforcing security policies completely statically via a type
system as in our previous work [18], Sapper dynamically
tracks security tags runtime, increasing the expressiveness
and decreasing the overhead required for security. Impor-
tantly, designers do not need to manually insert dynamic
tracking or enforcement logic. Instead, the Sapper com-
piler automatically does so in a provably sound manner. The
tracking and enforcement logic is generated based on static
analysis of Sapper programs to cover explicit, implicit, and
timing based information ﬂows.
Furthermore, Sapper (unlike any prior formally sound
hardware approach) enables hardware systems to be aware
of, and react to, the security tags of the data that they oper-
ate upon. Hardware designers have complete freedom to
choose how the system responds to runtime security viola-
tions. Despite this ﬂexibility, Sapper does all of this in a way
that allows the security properties of the system to be stati-
cally veriﬁed by the Sapper compiler.
3.1 Language Overview
Sapper extends upon a core subset of Verilog and requires
minimal changes to existing Verilog source code. A typical
Verilog program consists of three parts: signal declarations
that deﬁne registers and wires, a synchronous block, and a
combinational logic block. We refer registers here as ﬂip-
ﬂops that store data, and wires as communication channels
between ﬂip-ﬂops and logic gates. The synchronous block
is responsible for writing data back to ﬂip-ﬂops (i.e. regis-
ters) at clock edges. The combinational logic block contains
computation that will always be executed within one clock
cycle. Commands in combinational logic block are simi-
lar to those in software programming languages, including
assignments, branches and switch/cases. Although in prac-
tice hardware designs can be more complicated, most of
them can be reduced to such a simple model. In order to
make hardware designs less ambiguous, Sapper simpliﬁes
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Figure 1: Abstract Syntax of Sapper
the syntax by having designers to only write a single combi-
national logic block. All writes to regsiters will be automati-
cally compiled into a synchronous block by the Sapper com-
piler, while computation will remain in the combinational
logic block.
Figure 1 describes the abstract syntax of Sapper. We have
chosen the core subset such that all the interesting features
of the full language are covered. Other language clauses are
omitted either because their formal properties are trivial to
reason about (e.g., unary operations such as ∼x) or they can
be expressed equivalently using the syntax discussed in this
section (e.g., case/switch).
In the rest of the section, we start with a list of basic deﬁ-
nitions and assumptions; then describe how Sapper imple-
ments tracking and checking of security tags; how state
machinesareanintegralSapperabstractionforprecisetrack-
ing and enforcement; and ﬁnally how Sapper enables run-
time security tag manipulation and how Sapper enables con-
ﬁgurable yet secure reactions to runtime security violations.
The formal semantics of Sapper will be presented in the end
of the setion.
3.2 Deﬁnitions and Assumptions
We deﬁne some terms used in the remainder of the section:
• Variables: We refer to the set of registers, wires, inputs
and outputs in the hardware design as variables.
• Join: Given a security lattice, the operation ⊔ takes
two security levels as operands and calculates their least
upper bound in the lattice, e.g., high ⊔ low = high
• Security Context: The security context of a statement in
a Sapper program is informally deﬁned as the maximum
security level among all implicit information ﬂowing
into that statement. Sapper models the hardware design
as a state machine, and the system can only be in one
state at any given cycle. Hence the security context of1:￿￿￿￿state￿S￿=￿{
2: if ( a == 0 ) then { SC2 =￿S.tag 2:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿if￿(￿a￿ ￿0￿)￿then￿{
3:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿if￿(￿b￿==￿0￿)￿then￿
4:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿x￿:=￿0;￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
5:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿y￿:=￿0;
SC3 =￿SC5 =￿join(S.tag,￿a.tag)
SC ji( S b )
y ;
6:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿}
7:￿￿￿￿}
SC4 =￿join(S.tag,￿a.tag,￿b.tag)
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Example showing how to compute security context.
any statement is determined by the security context of
the current state as well as any conditionals guarding the
statement. The default security context of any statement
inside a state is the same as the security context of the
state itself. The security context of a statement inside
a branch is calculated by taking the join of the default
security context and the security level of the branch
condition. Figure 2 illustrates how the security context
is determined.
We assume that the security tags of data are public infor-
mation, i.e., that only knowing the security level of data
(but not the data’s value) will not leak any information. This
assumption is commonly used in previous work for enforc-
ing information ﬂow security. Without this assumption, the
system would not be able to react to any runtime security
violations, and hence could not enforce the security policy.
It is important to note that, Sapper does ensure that security
tags cannot be changed based upon data’s value in a way
that might violate security policies. More details are given
in Section 3.5.
We further assume that the set of security tags are based
on a statically-known (i.e., deﬁned at design time) security
lattice of arbitrary but ﬁnite size. Extending Sapper with
dynamically-deﬁned lattices rather than using a statically-
known lattice would allow different processes in a system
to deﬁne their own lattices for the hardware to enforce.
This can be done through efﬁcient protocols to encode and
decode security policies in the hardware. The Raksha archi-
tecture proposed by Dalton et al. [8] demonstrates one way
to achieve this. Supporting programmable lattices in Sapper
is left to future work.
3.3 Security Tags
Variables (i.e., signals, wires, etc.) in Sapper are associated
with security tags that are tracked and checked for secu-
rity policy violations at runtime. Checking every data move-
ment in hardware for violations of noninterference would be
extremely expensive, both in terms of additional hardware
and performance overhead. We observe that in most hard-
ware designs only certain outputs are exposed and observ-
able by software/programmers, and thus only these outputs
require strict enforcement. Many variables, such as internal
pipelineregistersandwiresusedtoholdintermediateresults,
are only used for temporary storage and are not directly
observable. These non-observable variables only require
security tags to be tracked dynamically so that their secu-
rity level is correctly reﬂected at runtime; no enforcement is
required. As such, Sapper allows designers to declare data
variables as one of the following two categories: Enforced
Tagged variables of which information ﬂow will always be
checked for non-interference, and Dynamic Tagged vari-
ables whose security tags will be automatically tracked and
propagated at runtime. By default, a variable declared in
Sapper is dynamic tagged. Designers can explciitly declare
a enforced tagged variable by giving it a initial security type.
This dichotomy requires designers to make decisions on
what data should be tracked versus enforced, but it is often
an easy decision to make since typical architectures only
consist of a small portion of components exposed to users or
central to data movement. In many architectures, selecting
enforced tags for all the bus output ports, the memory and
the cache will be sufﬁcient. Note that as long as the I/O
ports are enforced, not enforcing policies on some of the
other components does not lead to unsoundness, but rather
makes the system less precise and thus potentially harder
to use. The Sapper compiler is responsible for generating
dynamic tracking logic and inserting dynamic checks for
enforcement depending on the tag of the target variable.
Below we describe the details of tracking and enforcement.
3.3.1 Tracking Tags
Assignments to dynamic tagged variables will trigger the
propagation of security tags: the maximum security level
over all information that may affect the assigned value
(directly or indirectly) shall be propagated to the target vari-
able’s tag (rule ASSIGN-DYN-REG in Figure 6(a)). Without
careful consideration, simply tracking information at a ﬁne
granularity can lead to signiﬁcant overhead, as in previous
work. In general, tracking overhead consists of two parts:
extra hardware bits needed to store security labels and extra
hardware logic needed to perform tag propagations. Sapper
aims at achieving the ﬂexibility of dynamic tracking with
minimum overhead. Instead of generating tracking logic
for every single logic gate as in some previous work [31],
Sapper takes advantage of static analysis on the HDL code
and inserts tracking logic aggregately at the granularity of
expressions and code blocks. Potential implicit ﬂows (i.e.,
information ﬂows arising from conditionals) are also derived
by the compiler, which inserts logic to ensure sound secu-
rity tag propagation. Purely dynamic tracking cannot handle
implicit ﬂows, and thus the static analysis is required to
make this possible.
Sapper also uses simple logic to compute security levels:
the security level of the output is the least upper bound of
the security levels of the inputs. Sapper tracks security labels
and tags data appropriately at the register level; 4 each vari-
able has an n-bit tag independent of that variable’s width,
4Note that we do not mean only architectural registers here (like %eax),
we mean register-transfer-level registers, which is any set of bits used as a
group in the hardware description language.wherendependsonthesizeofthesecuritylattice.Thecache
and main memory are each treated as a continuous array of
m-bit registers (where m is the width of the hardware being
designed), with a n-bit label for each m bits.
In theory, Sapper may be less precise (but still sound)
compared to bit- and gate-level tracking due to the coarser
tracking granularity and relaxed tag propagation. However
we observe that the major purpose of using precise ﬁne-
grainedtrackinginpreviousworkistoavoidlabelcreep5 and
allow a secure switch from a high to low security context.
In the next section we will describe how the “nested states”
feature we use in Sapper provides exactly what is needed
to satisfy this requirement. In fact, there is nothing that
prohibits bit-level tracking in Sapper, but we believe this is
not necessary because the state transforms can be expressed
in the language itself rather than needing to be inferred
from the generated logic. Hence Sapper achieves sufﬁcient
precision for security enforcement with signiﬁcantly less
overhead while retaining a high degree of ﬂexibility.
3.3.2 Enforcing Policy
Any assignment to a variable with enforced tags needs
to be checked for noninterference and violations must be
dealt with in a secure way (rule ASSIGN-ENF-REG in Fig-
ure 6(a)). Speciﬁcally, the security level of the target variable
must be higher than or equal to the maximum security level
of information that may affect the assigned value. The neces-
sary enforcement conditions will be derived by the compiler
and the security checks will be automatically inserted into
the resulting logic. Therefore, these assignments will take
effect only when they are guaranteed to be secure. Sapper
also provides ﬂexibility for designers to specify how the
system should handle violations, which will be described
in Section 3.6. Figure 3 shows the generated Verilog code
for an 8-bit-and design written in Sapper. There are two
different cases shown in the ﬁgure, one with enforcement
(CHECK) while another with tracking (TRACK) only. Note
that both the tracking and enforcement logic are automat-
ically generated by the compiler and there is no need for
designers to manually specify anything except the initial
enforced tags.
3.4 A State Machine-based Language
Timing in synchronous hardware designs is strictly aligned
to clock edges; for example, registers are only updated at
clock edges. To capture the notion of hardware timing, the
Sapper language explicitly models hardware designs as state
machines. During a clock cycle the hardware can only be in
one of the state machine’s logical states,6 and all of the pro-
gram logic from that state will be executed within that clock
5Label creep happens when a large portion of the system has to be conser-
vatively marked as tainted due to inability of a more precise analysis
6In the following discussion, state will always mean a state of the ﬁnite
state machine speciﬁed by a Sapper program.
reg[7:0] a : L, reg[7:0] a,b,c;
reg a tag b tag c tag;
Sapper Verilog
CHECK reg[7:0] b, c;
a <= b & c;
reg a_tag,b_tag,c_tag;
if (a_tag>=(b_tag|c_tag))
a <= b & c;
[] b
CHECK
reg[7:0] a,b,c;
reg a_tag,b_tag,c_tag;
a <= b & c;
at a g <= bt a g | ct a g;
TRACK reg[7:0] a, b, c;
a <= b & c;
_ g _ g | _ g;
Figure 3: An 8-bit adder written in Sapper along with the generated
Verilog code. There are two cases: in the ﬁrst case register a is
enforced tagged hence the assignment needs to be checked for
noninterference; in the second case a is dynamic tagged hence only
tracking is needed.
cycle. State transitions (indicated by goto in the Sapper pro-
gram) always take effect at clock edges. Another important
motivation behind modeling hardware as state machines is
that state machines are a common pattern used by hardware
designers, and most hardware designs are already written as
or can be easily transformed to state machines.
Because state transitions can be conditional, they open up
the possibility of implicit leaks, i.e., information ﬂow due
to conditional execution. Therefore states must also have
security tags, and these tags must be correctly propagated
or checked during state transitions just like tags for vari-
able. In the same manner as variables, states can be declared
with enforced or dynamic tags. The security level of states
with dynamic tags will be tracked dynamically at runtime,
while states with enforced tags will be enforced for nonin-
terference and their security level will not change unless it
is explicitly modiﬁed. An immediate advantage of Sapper is
that a single dynamic tagged state can safely act at differ-
ent security levels at runtime, and hence that state can be
reused between different security levels instead of requiring
the design to duplicate states in order to have one per secu-
rity level.
To properly enforce noninterference in the presence of
conditional execution, a transition from some state A to
some state B should only occur if A’s tag is lower than B’s
tag. In the case of a state machine diagram that is strongly
connected (i.e., every state can reach every other state), the
existence of any high state will eventually require all states
to be high. This problem is known as label creep. Sapper
uses the concept of nested states proposed in Caisson [18]
to solve this problem. States can be organized hierarchically
as a tree structure. Within each clock cycle, before executing
the logic of some state S, the logic of S’s parent state must
be executed ﬁrst; this rule is recursively applied until the
root of the tree. To give parent states complete control over
the execution of child states, fall commands are used to
explicitly indicate transfer of control from the parent state
to the child state. By having parent states with low security
levels and child states with high security levels, low stateshave the freedom to decide when to terminate high states
without violating security.
Figure 4 shows an example of a state machine diagram
for a secure hardware design based on TDMA (Time Divi-
sion Multiple Access), which is a common design pattern
used by secure systems. A trusted timer (low) is used to
control the execution of untrusted components. In particular,
the Master state (trusted, labeled with low, enforced tagged)
sets up a timer and transits to the Slave state (also trusted,
low), which falls into its child state (potentially untrusted,
dynamic tagged) and executes the computation logic. At the
beginning of every cycle, the Slave State is always executed
ﬁrst and the timer is checked. If the timer expires then con-
trol will transfer back to the Master State. The security level
of the child state (i.e., Pipeline State in the diagram) can be
either high or low at runtime depending on the data it is deal-
ing with at the time. No matter what level it is, it will never
affect the behavior of the parent states, thus enforcing non-
interference. The corresponding implementation inSapper is
also shown on the side. When the code is compiled down to
Verilog, tracking and checking logic will be generated based
on the Sapper formal semantics. Although the runtime secu-
rity level of the Pipeline State is dynamically changing, the
generatedcheckinglogicwillguaranteethattheMasterState
is always trusted.
To ensure that state transitions and falls are securely per-
formed, Sapper provides the following rules for goto com-
mands and fall commands:
• goto to enforced tagged state (GOTO-ENFORCED):
For a state transition goto S in which S is a enforced
tagged state, it is required that the security context of
the goto command be lower than the security level of S,
otherwise information can leak implicitly.
• goto to dynamic tagged state (GOTO-DYNAMIC): For a
state transition goto S in which S is a dynamic tagged
state, no enforcement is required. Instead, the security
tag of the target state S will be updated to the security
context of the goto command. Furthermore, if a goto
command isguarded byconditionals(i.e.,thesystemcan
transit to different states based on the value of condi-
tions), implicit ﬂows exist from the current state to all
reachable states via the conditional goto commands. To
precisely capture such implicit ﬂows statically, the secu-
rity tags of all dynamic registers that are assigned in all
goto-reachable states need to be updated to the security
context of the goto. This rule is the major cause of label
creep in most designs, and Sapper provides nested states
to contain states with higher security level in the child
group,leavingparentstatesunaffectedbythe gotosfrom
child states.
• fall to enforced tagged state (FALL-ENFORCED): fall
to a enforced tagged state has the same rule as goto to a
enforced tagged state.
Root
reg[31:0] timer : L;
state Master:L = {
timer = 100;
goto Slave;
Master Slave
goto Slave;
}
state Slave:L = {
let state pipeline = {
// Pipeline logic
Pi li
// Pipeline logic
goto pipeline;
}
in
if (timer == 0) begin
t M t Pipeline goto Master;
end else begin
timer <= timer - 1;
fall;
end
}
Figure 4: State Machine Diagram example of a secure hardware
controller, along with its corresponding implementation in Sapper.
Noninterference is achieved by having a trusted timer controlling
the behavior of the computation logic.
• fall to dynamic tagged state (FALL-DYNAMIC): When
there is a fall from a state A to its child state B, the secu-
rity tag of B will be updated to the join of the context
of the fall and the current security level of B. The rea-
son we need to take the current security level of B into
consideration is as follows: when we have a goto from
one state to another, their ancestor states will be executed
ﬁrstalongwithaseriesof fallcommands.Hencebeforea
fall to state B, there can exist a goto B which will update
B’s security level to be the context of the goto.
3.5 Manipulating Tags
One important advantage of Sapper compared to purely
static mechanisms is that security labels can be read, reacted
upon, and updated atruntime. Aswe have deﬁned earlier,the
security level of enforced tagged registers will not change
until they are explicitly modiﬁed through the language pro-
vided interface. This feature can be used by system kernels
to efﬁciently and securely share memory among different
security levels (e.g., the kernel can allocate memory to a
high process, then reclaim it, reset the memory’s tag to low,
and allocate it to a low process). Although we allow secu-
rity tags to be modiﬁed explicitly, they cannot be modiﬁed
arbitrarily, otherwise information can be leaked. Sapper pro-
vides a pre-deﬁned command setTag to allow modiﬁcation
of the security tags of enforced tagged variables and states.
Sapper language rules will ensure that no information can be
leaked by using this command: (1) the security level of any
data can only be changed under a context whose level is not
higher than the data’s (e.g., low data cannot be hoisted under
a high context), thus no information can ﬂow from high to
low by manipulating tags; and (2) when data is downgraded
(e.g., changed from high to low) the data is automatically
zeroed instantly to avoid leakage. The logic for checking,
changing the tag, and zeroing the data is generated by the
Sapper compiler. The formal semantics of this instruction is
provided in Figure 6(a) (SET-REG-TAG). Explicit declassi-
ﬁcation is not supported as Sapper is currently targeted toinformation-theoretic rather than cryptographic notions of
security. Declassiﬁcation can be added and is certainly use-
ful in many cases (e.g. a crypto unit). It will be a simple
relaxation of our existing mechanism for modifying security
levels. Of course one must be careful how declassiﬁcation is
allowed; but these mechanisms have been extensively stud-
ied in the literature [21, 26].
3.6 Handling Security Violations
As previously described, the Sapper compiler will insert
checking logic in the appropriate locations in the design to
detect all security policy violations. The natural question,
then, is how should the system react if the runtime check
does not pass, i.e., the security policy is about to be vio-
lated. To handle this situation, the Sapper compiler inserts
alternative actions that are executed instead of any violating
operation. For each enforced operation, Sapper has a default
replacement action that is guaranteed to be secure. These
default actions are inserted into the generated Verilog code
in the form of branches as shown in Figure 5(a). For exam-
ple, a default secure action can turn a violating assignment
into a noop, or turn a violating state transition into a different
transition to a secure state.
To give hardware designers full ﬂexibility to decide how
to react to runtime security violations, Sapper provides a
language interface for specifying the replacement behavior
when violation is about to happen. The syntax is shown in
Figure 5(b), which speciﬁes that if there exists any secu-
rity violation in command, secure action will be executed
in replace of command. The above code will also be trans-
formed into a branch by the Sapper compiler as shown in the
ﬁgure.
Note that command will never be speculatively executed,
instead, only one of secure action and command will be exe-
cuted depending on the value of the generated condition.
These otherwise rules can be deﬁned recursively, mean-
ing that the action in the otherwise branch can itself have
potential violations or even another otherwise clause. These
nested otherwise clauses are terminated by the default, guar-
anteed safe action; thus all commands in the program are
guaranteed to be secure even if designers provide buggy
otherwise clauses. ﬁgure 5(c) shows an example when the
provided action is also a command that requires runtime
enforcement.
3.7 Formal Semantics of Sapper
Figure 6(a) provides the formal semantics for Sapper. The
semantic domains and evaluation context grammar used in
these semantic rules are provided in Figure 6(d). The seman-
tics in Figure 6(a) also makes use of big-step semantic
relations for expressions (given by ⇓e, which are standard
and omitted) and big-step semantic rules for tag expres-
sions provided in Figure 6(b). The deﬁnition of φ, which is
used in the semantic rules, is provided in Figure 6(c). The
abstract machine conﬁguration (provided in Figure 6(d)) for
command
if (derived condition)
command; ;
else
default action; (a)
command otherwise secure action
if (derived condition)
command;
l else
secure action; (b)
command 1 otherwise command 2
if (derived condition 1)
command_1;
else if (derived condition 2) command_1 otherwise command_2 else if (derived condition 2)
command_2;
else
d f lt ti default action; (c)
Figure 5: Violation handling logic generated by our Sapper com-
piler: (a) any command that requires enforcement will be guarded
by conditions that enforce noninterference. These conditions are
generated by static analysis on the context of the command. If the
conditions fail, a secure default action (provided by the compiler)
will be executed instead; (b) designers can also specify replace-
ment actions of their own, using the otherwise clause; (c) When the
designer-provided action also requires enforcement, our compiler
will generate conditions and default secure actions recursively.
the semantic rules in Figure 6(a) consists of (1) the current
program phrase p, (2) a fall map ρ, (3) a store σ, (4) a tag
map θ, (5) a security context stack S, and (6) current time
value δ.
Wedeﬁnethefollowingmappingsforeachℓ ∈ ProgramLabel
that are used in the semantic rules:
• if ℓ refers to a state name, Fpnt(ℓ) maps to the label of
state ℓ’s parent state.
• if ℓ refers to a state name, Fcmd(ℓ) maps to state ℓ’s
command.
• If ℓ is a label attached to an if statement, then Fcd(ℓ)
maps to the set of all the registers that are targets of
assignments control-dependent on the if statement, union
with the set of all dynamic states whose reachability (via
goto or fall) is control dependent on the if statement.
In addition, Froot maps to the root command of the prog
program phrase. Finally, we also deﬁne the following two
helper functions:
• ResetFallMap takes a FallMap ρ and a state label ℓ and
returns a new FallMap ρ′ identical to ρ except that label ℓ
and the labels of all states that are descendents of ℓ in the
state hierarchy are mapped to their default child states
(the same as their initial values).
• ResetTagMap takes a TagMap θ and a state label ℓ
and returns a new TagMap θ′ identical to θ except
that (1) labels of all dynamic states that are descen-
dents of ℓ in the state hierarchy are mapped to ⊥ (2)
if isDynamicState(ℓ), ℓ is mapped to ⊥.
A proof of non-interference is given in Appendix A.✐
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(a) Semantic rules for Sapper. Throughout the rules, we assume S = sc::Σ. Various helper functions are used, which are
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(d) Semantic domains and evaluation context grammar.
Figure 6: Sapper SemanticsInstruction￿Type Instruction List
Additive￿Arithmetic add,￿addu,￿addiu,￿sub,￿subu
Binary￿Arithmetic and,￿andi,￿or,￿ori, xor,￿xori,￿nor,￿sll,￿sllv,￿sra,￿srav,￿srl,￿srlv
Multiplicative
Arithmetic
mult,￿multu, div
Arithmetic
FPU￿instructions add.s,￿sub.s,￿mul.s,￿div.s,￿neg.s,￿abs.s,￿mov.s cvt.s.w,￿
cvt.w.s,￿le.s,￿lt.s,￿ge.s,￿gt.s
Branch beq bgt ble bne bltz bgez; beql bnel blel bltzl; bc1t Branch beq, bgt,￿ble,￿bne,￿bltz,￿bgez;￿beql,￿bnel,￿blel,￿bltzl;￿bc1t
Jump j,￿jr,￿jal,￿jalr
Memory Operation lb,￿lbu,￿lhu,￿lw,￿sb,￿sh,￿sw; lwl,￿lwr, swl,￿swr; swc1,￿lwc1
Others slti,￿sltiu,￿lui,￿mflo,￿mfhi,￿mtc1,￿mfc1
Security Related setrtag*,￿setrtimer
Figure 7: Complete ISA of our processor.
Module Name LOC
Fetch 52 Fetch 52
Decode + Register File 590
Execute + ALU + FPU 3981
Memory + Cache 442
Write Back 29
Control Logic + Forwarding + Stalling 303 g g g
Total 5397
Figure8:LinesofCode(LOC)ofeachcomponentinourprocessor.
4. Processor Design and Evaluation
Sapper is capable of building a wide variety of security criti-
cal hardware, e.g., an arbiter, a network-on-chip, or a secure
co-processor. In this section, we evaluate Sapper’s utility
speciﬁcally on one of the most general purpose designs one
might consider building: a pipelined microprocessor. Our
microprocessor design is signiﬁcantly more complex than
any existing processor designs with strong security prop-
erties presented in the literature [18, 29, 30]. We describe
in detail what kind of processor we have built, how we
implement it in Sapper to enforce noninterference, and how
we validate its functional correctness and security enforce-
ment. Finally, we demonstrate the beneﬁts of our technique
through empirical evaluation of hardware overhead for two
security policies: a simple two-level policy, and a more com-
plicated “diamond” policy.
4.1 Processor Description
Our processor design is a 5-stage pipelined processor with
a number of components that can be found in modern pro-
cessors, including cache, a division/multiplication unit, and
a ﬂoating point unit that alone accounts for 3000+ lines of
code. Typical pipelining techniques, including hazard detec-
tion, stalling, and data forwarding, are all implemented. Fig-
ure 8 lists the components of the processor along with their
lines of code (LOC). The total length of the implementa-
tion is over 5K LOC. A majority of the standard MIPS ISA
is implemented as shown in Figure 7. The ability to design
a practical processor with strict security properties that has
logic similar to that found in modern CPUs has signiﬁcant
value—not only because more complex systems are simply
harder to evaluate for security, but because it also demon-
strates the expressiveness of our technique.
We implement an L1 cache, shared by both data and
instructions. The main memory is modeled as a single
large register array (64MB) that supports byte-level random
access with one read port and one write port. This simpliﬁed
memory system still allows us to exercise the basic function-
ality of the processor and cache in a non-trivial manner.
4.2 Security Enforcement
Along with the standard MIPS instructions, the processor
supports two extra security related instructions called set-
tag and set-timer. Neither instruction is part of the Sapper
language syntax, rather, they are hardware-provided ISA
instructions implemented in Sapper. It is worth noting that
here set-tag is an ISA instruction of the processor, while
setTag described in the previous section is a command in
the Sapper syntax. The set-tag instruction allows software
to explicitly modify the security tag of a word in memory
(the memory is modeled as an array of enforced tagged
words). This instruction is implemented through the setTag
primitive in Sapper. Security checks to ensure the safety
of the instruction are automatically generated as we have
described in Section 3.5.
The set-timer instruction allows software to set the timing
boundary of any untrusted program and allows for securely
switching from a high to low security context under the
control of software running on the processor. It is imple-
mented in the hardware by taking advantage of the nested
states feature in Sapper: the parent state controls the timer
(an enforced tagged register) which is always labeled as low,
and it checks whether the timer expires every cycle while
running high code in child states. When the timer expires it
always switches back to the low state. Calling the set-timer
instruction from software will modify the value of the timer
register. Because it is an enforced tagged register, the value
change operation will always be checked to ensure that a
high program can never change the value of timer. The state
machine structure of our processor is similar to that shown
in our previous example in Figure 4.
Without Sapper, one has to implement a cache very care-
fully, using sophisticated techniques in order to deliver
strong security guarantees. However, even sophisticated
designs can still be vulnerable to attacks due to unforeseen
considerations [15]. In contrast, a cache implemented with
Sapper is always guaranteed to enforce noninterference no
matter how it is implemented. However, it is worth mention-
ing that an insecure cache design if Sapper is not involved
will become a buggy cache when Sapper is applied, since
the checking logic will change cache behavior when viola-
tions are about to occur. Designers must make certain that
the resulting cache design is functionally correct, which for-
tunately is a requirement even when security is not a designgoal—the processor can be tested without changing exist-
ing testing frameworks. In our processor design, we simply
implement the cache as two partitions corresponding to the
two security levels. We choose this scheme for its simplic-
ity and effectiveness, however Sapper is not limited to this
technique. For example, one could choose to ﬂush the cache
at every context switch from low to high. More advanced
scheduling schemes can also be applied and their security
guarantees can be easily tested.
TheadvantageofSapperoverprevioustechniquesbecomes
clearwhenlookingattheimplementationofmemory.Instead
of being forced to partition the memory into independent
sections with one per security level, as proposed by all pre-
vious approaches, Sapper allows sharing of the same mem-
ory among different security levels in a secure manner. The
set-tag instruction allows the kernel to manage the memory
and recall resources securely upon context switches.
4.3 Functional Validation
We implement our processor in Sapper and compile it to
Verilog using the Sapper compiler. To demonstrate the com-
plexity and functional completeness of our processor design,
we use Mentor Graphics ModelSim to simulate our pro-
cessor. We pick applications from various benchmark suites
and load them into our processor. Since we have not devel-
oped a fully-featured operating system that supports I/O
and dynamic memory allocation, we modify each applica-
tion so that all I/O operations are in memory and memory
resources are statically allocated. We pick benchmarks from
two benchmark suites for evaluation, SPEC CPU 2006 [2]
and MiBench [12], due to their popularity in evaluating
architecturaldesigns.Weonlychoosearepresentativesubset
fromeach benchmark suiteduetosigniﬁcanteffortsrequired
to modify each application to run on our processor without
operating system support. Note that we do not modify the
applications in any way that would change the functional-
ity or behaviors that are not related to system calls. As such,
we are able to validate our processor by cross-comparing the
output of a benchmark on our processor with its output on a
real machine.
The evaluated applications include three benchmarks
(mcf, specrand and bzip2) from SPEC CPU2006, 2 security
benchmarks (sha, rijndael), and one ﬂoating point bench-
mark (FFT) from MiBench. These applications are com-
piled with the GCC 3.4.4 cross-compiler targeting MIPS
binaries, which are then loaded into a dedicated range of
memory in our processor. We chose this GCC version due to
its simplicity when used as a cross-compiler for generating
well-formatted MIPS binaries. Being able to run realistic
and diversiﬁed benchmark suites on the processor shows the
potential and power of Sapper, that it is possible to design
and implement a provably information ﬂow secure processor
that is comparable to commercial embedded processors. In
fact, running real benchmarks forced us to debug all kinds
of corner cases, some related to functional correctness and
somecaptured by Sapper as securityﬂaws. We spentroughly
ﬁve times as long debugging the processor as we spent in its
initial development.
4.4 Security Validation
We demonstrate that our processor enforces noninterference
at runtime by running applications with different security
levels on our processor. To do so, we implement a simpli-
ﬁed micro-kernel in MIPS assembly. It contains a scheduler
that can schedule among multiple processes with different
security levels and be responsible for storing/restoring the
registers during a context switch. A static memory alloca-
tion mechanism is also implemented to provide private stack
space for each process. It is important to note that the micro-
kernel is not providing any security enforcement: all security
enforcement is achieved through Sapper in the processor.
The major responsibility of the micro-kernel is to provide
a useful interface to applications running on it.
To take advantage of the processor’s capability to pre-
vent timing leaks, the kernel issues a “set-timer” instruction
before every switch to an untrusted application. The pro-
cessor guarantees that when the timer expires, the control
always jumps back to the kernel. The kernel will be respon-
sible for storing all register values and restoring them before
the next switch to the same application to ensure it contin-
ues from wherever it pauses. To make the system more efﬁ-
cient, the micro-kernel is responsible for reclaiming memory
regions for reuse through set-tag instructions.
4.5 Quantitative Evaluation
For a quantitative analysis, we evaluate the overhead that
Sapper imposes on the hardware by synthesizing our pro-
cessor to a 90nm library provided by Synopsys [1] and com-
pare this to an insecure base processor in terms of area
(ASIC chip area), delay (estimates minimum clock period),
and power (total power including both leakage power and
dynamic power). We also compare Sapper with two existing
secure hardware design mechanisms, namely GLIFT [31]
and Caisson [18]. Since neither Caisson nor Sapper changes
the number of cycles a program will execute, the clock delay
determines performance.
We ﬁrst implement our processor design without any
security features using standard Verilog (designated the
Base Processor). To collect overhead results for our pro-
cessor design with GLIFT logic, the base processor is ﬁrst
synthesized using Synopsys’ Design Compiler targeting its
and or.db library which contains only gate primitives
(AND, OR, and Inverters) and ﬂip-ﬂops. At this stage, the
processor is augmented with GLIFT logic by associating
information ﬂow tracking logic with each gate. Once the
tracking logic has been added, the GLIFT processor is syn-
thesized again, this time targeting the 90nm library to obtain
area, delay and power results. Note that GLIFT only pro-
vides tracking logic without enforcement (which can be
done through an architectural mechanism named Execution!"#$%&&#"’ ()*+’,"%-’./012’ 3%4-5’.6&2’ !#7%"’.082’ 9%0#"5’
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Figure 9: Hardware overhead comparison of processors designed
with different techniques: the original non-secure processor (Base
Processor), processor designed under GLIFT, Caisson and Sapper,
normalized to the Base Processor.
Lease [29]), however adding Execution Lease support would
make the overhead even larger than GLIFT alone [29].
We then migrate our base processor (as a Verilog pro-
gram) into both Caisson and Sapper, both enforcing the
same noninterference guarantee. We also add the two new
security-related instructions to the ISA in both processors
to support an interface for software. Both designs are then
compiled back into Verilog—the design in Caisson is type
checked, while the design in Sapper is augmented with
tracking and checking logic. Once both designs are in Ver-
ilog, the designs are synthesized using the same 90nm
library to obtain results. Memory itself cannot be synthe-
sized directly using this methodology, and depending on
the technology, size, and type of memory, varying results
would be obtained. As a result, we only synthesize the data-
path and control logic of the processor. This does, however,
include the logic associated with the memory subsystem,
including cache control logic.
We now have four versions of the processor design, with
almost identical functionality (because the GLIFT version
does not provide enforcement). Figure 9 shows the overhead
for the Base, GLIFT, Caisson, and Sapper processors. The
GLIFT and Caisson processors incur a 7.6× and 2× area
overhead, respectively. The Sapper processor, on the other
hand, imposes an overhead of only 1.04×. Similar observa-
tions also apply to delay and power. We also observe that
Caisson’s intensive use of multiplexers to select the right
security level for each register/wire use leads to signiﬁcant
overhead when the processor design complexity increases.
Elimination of those multiplexers is a big gain for Sapper.
Furthermore, since both GLIFT and Caisson require dupli-
cation of resources, memory itself must be duplicated, while
in Sapper no duplication is necessary (only extra tag store is
required, taking 3% overhead). This provides further incen-
tive for using Sapper in systems which are heavily memory
dominated and have little space for extra functional logic.
4.6 Diamond Lattice
To demonstrate the scalabilityof Sapper, we furtheraugment
our processor with a more complex security lattice that con-
tains four security levels (L, H, M1, and M2). This “dia-
mond lattice” has L as the lowest element, H as the highest
element, and M1 and M2 both being higher than L and less
than H (and noncomparable with each other). This lattice
can be used to demonstrate the enforcement of both secrecy
and integrity in the same system, a big step towards imple-
menting a practical provably secure system. We found that
supporting a more complex lattice is as natural as imple-
menting a two-level lattice, since all states will be traced and
checked in similar ways. We did not need to modify the Sap-
per design except for the lattice speciﬁcation. Major changes
to the generated design (introduced by the Sapper compiler)
includeonemorebitforeachtagandrelativelymorecompli-
cated checking logic to compare among four different secu-
rity levels. We do need to modify the micro-kernel to handle
the scheduling among four different security levels, however
this was straightforward. With the same evaluation method
as used above, a secure processor enforcing noninterference
on a diamond lattice using Sapper incurs only slightly more
overhead (3% more) compared to a two-level lattice counter-
part. While supporting such kind of lattice in Caisson would
require duplicate all resource into four pieces.
5. Conclusions
This paper is a step towards a new class of tools that help
inform hardware designers about the security ramiﬁcations
of their design choices and that assist them in guarding
against unforeseen exploits. We explore provable security
properties in hardware designs through Sapper, an extension
of the Verilog hardware description language that automati-
cally augments a hardware design with appropriate security
checks so that it is impossible to violate an information ﬂow
security policy. While there isstillmore work to do, we have
proven the security of Sapper’s constructions with respect
to speciﬁed policies; we have shown Sapper’s expressive
power by designing a complex processor core that includes
non-trivial microarchitectural features complete enough to
execute a number of real-world programs; and we have per-
formed a quantitative evaluation that shows we can provide
security at a reasonably low cost while remaining expressive
enough to describe complex and interesting designs.
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A. Proof of Noninterference
A.1 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions on Sapper programs
(each of these are easily enforced by a syntactic pass over
the program):
• For each fallℓ, the subscript ℓ must be the label of the
state containing that fall command. A leaf state cannot
contain a fall.
• For each gotoℓ1 ℓ2, subscript ℓ1 must indicate the state
containing that goto command, and ℓ2 must a state in the
same group and at the same depth.
• Either both branches of an if command must execute a
goto or fall or neither of them do. All paths through a
state end in either a goto or a fall.
• Each if statement is given a unqiue label.
• The root state is ﬁxed.
A.2 L-equivalence
OurnoninterferencetheoremusesthenotionofL-equivalence
between conﬁgurations, which we deﬁne in this section.
For a given security level t, let L = {t′ | t′ ⊑ t} and
H = {t′ | t′ / ∈ L}. We use this deﬁnition in the rest of the
section. We then have the following L-equivalence deﬁni-
tions:
• Store: Two stores are L-equivalent if all L-tagged reg-
isters have the same value in both stores, i.e., σ1 ∼L
σ2 ⇐⇒ ∀x. x is a register ∧x ∈ dom(σi=1,2)∧θ(x) ∈
L ⇒ σ1(x) = σ2(x)
• Stack: Two stacks are L-equivalent, i.e.., sc1 :: Σ1 ∼L
sc2 :: Σ2, if both the following conditions hold: (1)
sc1 ∈ L ∨ sc2 ∈ L ⇒ sc1 = sc2 ∧ Σ1 = Σ2,
(2) Let ζL(S) return a new stack obtained by popping
out elements from S until its top element ∈ L, then
sc1 ∈ H ∧ sc2 ∈ H ⇒ ζL(Σ1) = ζL(Σ2).
• FallMap, TagMap: Two pairs of FallMap and TagMap
are L-equivalent, i.e..,  ρ1,θ1  ∼L  ρ2,θ2 , if both the
following conditions hold: (1) If one FallMap maps to
a L-tagged state, then the other FallMap maps to the
same state, i.e.., ∀l. θ1(ρ1(ℓ)) ∈ L ∨ θ2(ρ2(ℓ)) ∈ L ⇒
ρ1(ℓ) = ρ2(ℓ) (2) If in one TagMap, a TaggedEntity is
tagged L, then it is tagged L in the other TagMap too,
i.e.., ∀u. θ1(u) ∈ L ⇐⇒ θ2(u) ∈ L.
• Conﬁguration: Let C1 =  p1,ρ1,σ1,θ1,sc1 :: Σ1,δ1 
and C2 =  p2,ρ2,σ2,θ2,sc2 :: Σ2,δ2 . Two conﬁgura-
tions C1 and C2 are L-equivalent, i.e.., C1 ∼L C2, if
the following conditions hold: (1) p1 and p2 are either
syntactically equivalent or sc1 ∈ H ∧ sc2 ∈ H, (2)
 ρ1,θ1  ∼L  ρ2,θ2 , (3) σ1 ∼L σ2, (4) sc1 :: Σ1 ∼L
sc2::Σ2, (5) δ1 = δ2
In effect, two L-equivalent conﬁgurations are indistin-
guishable to an observer at a security level in L.
A.3 Lemmas
We provide two Lemmas in this subsection, which are used
in the proof of noninterference in the next subsection. The
Simple Security Lemma states that L-tagged expressions are
made up of L-tagged subexpressions only. The Conﬁnement
Lemma states that program steps taken with security context
in H preserves L-equivalence.Lemma 1 (Simple Security). φ(e) ∈ L ⇒ (∀e′. e′ is a
subexpression of e ⇒ φ(e′) ∈ L)
Proof. By induction on deﬁnition of φ in Figure 6(c).
Lemma 2 (Conﬁnement). Let C1 =  p1,ρ1,σ1,θ1,sc1 ::
Σ1,δ1  and C2 =  p2,ρ2,σ2,θ2,sc2 :: Σ2,δ2 . Then if
C1   C2∧sc1 ∈ H ∧sc2 ∈ H ⇒ σ1 ∼L σ2∧ ρ1,θ1  ∼L
 ρ2,θ2 .
Proof. By induction on p1
A.4 Noninterference
ThenoninterferencetheoremstatesthatifanL-observercan-
not distinguish between two conﬁgurations at the beginning
of a cycle, then she cannot distinguish between them at the
beginning of the next cycle either. We assume that an L-
observer can observe changes to L-tagged registers only at
the beginning of each cycle, not during the cycle itself. This
assumption is valid because we are designing synchronous
hardware—changes to register values come into effect only
at the end of a cycle. Two computations can take a differ-
ent number of semantic steps within a single cycle, but the
hardware is timed such that the two computations still com-
plete at exactly the same time. We measure time in number
ofcyclesandthusthetheoremofnoninterferenceweprovide
is timing-sensitive. The formal statement of noninterference
is as follows:
Theorem 1 (Noninterference). Let
C1 =  Froot,ρ1,σ1,θ1,Σ1,δ ,C′
1 =  Froot,ρ′
1,σ′
1,θ′
1,Σ′
1,δ+1 ,
C2 =  Froot,ρ2,σ2,θ2,Σ2,δ ,C′
2 =  Froot,ρ′
2,σ′
2,θ′
2,Σ′
2,δ+1 
and  ∗ be the reﬂexive transitive closure of  .
Then C1  ∗ C′
1 ∧ C2  ∗ C′
2 ∧ C1 ∼L C2 ⇒ C′
1 ∼L C′
2
Proof. Basis: C1 ∼L C2, because the  ∗ is reﬂexive, the
case holds trivially.
Inductive Step: Let
• Ca =  pa,ρa,σa,θa,sca::Σa,δ 
• Cb =  pb,ρb,σb,θb,scb::Σb,δ 
• C′
a =  p′
a,ρ′
a,σ′
a,θ′
a,sc′
a::Σ′
a,δ 
• C′
b =  p′
b,ρ′
b,σ′
b,θ′
b,sc′
b::Σ′
b,δ 
Also, let Ca ∼L Cb, Ca   C′
a and Cb   C′
b. Then we
need to prove C′
a ∼L C′
b. We divide this proof sketch into 2
cases:
(1) When pa = pb. We prove this by induction on pa. Due
to the lack of space, we only sketch the proof for a subset of
what pa can stand for:
• When pa = r := e and r is a enforced register (refer
rule ASSIGN-ENF-REG): The register r has the same tag
in both θa and θb. If the tag ∈ L, then the register r
is mapped to n in both the stores (when the dynamic
check, that the tag of the register is ⊒ tag of e join the
current security context, succeeds in both cases), or both
thestoresremainthesame(ifdynamic check inonefails,
it fails in the other), using Lemma 1. If the tag ∈ H,
then taking this step does not modify L-observable store.
Hence this case holds.
• When pa = ifℓ e then c else c; endif (refer rule IF): If
sca,scb ∈ L, then executing the if statement will push
thesametagontothesecuritycontextstack(hencesc′
a =
sc′
b). Also, both θa,θb are modiﬁed in the same way,
because Fcd is a constant function (note that we update
all registers that are control dependent on the if statement
to handle implicit ﬂows due to branches not taken). The
tag of e is ℓ in both cases (in which case p′
a = p′
b),
or H in both cases (in which case sc′
a,sc′
b ∈ H). If
sca,scb ∈ H, then from Lemma 2, L-equivalence is
preserved by taking this step. Hence this case holds.
• When pa = skip; endif (refer rule ENDIF): This state-
ment pops the top of the security context stack. Based
on the deﬁnition of the L-equivalence of stacks, and our
assumption that if one branch of an if does not have a
goto or fall, the other branch does not either, this case
holds.
• When pa = gotoℓ1 ℓ2 and ℓ2 is a enforced state (refer
rule GOTO-ENFORCED): In the step taken in both con-
ﬁgurations, the security context stack is set to the tag of
the root state. If sca,scb ∈ L, either the dynamic check
(that tag of state ℓ2 ⊒ the current security context) suc-
ceeds in both cases or fails in both cases, modifying the
fall map in the same way. If sca,scb ∈ H, then they do
not modify the fall map for any states with tag ∈ L. Thus
this case holds.
(2) When sca,scb ∈ H: for the cases where neither
pa,pb is endif or goto, proof follows from Conﬁnement
Lemma. Hence this case holds. Consider the case where one
command is a goto and the other is not: since all program
paths must end in goto, the other command will eventually
be goto. Since the cycle length is enforced, both gotos are
executed only at the end of each cycle. Hence even if they
take different number of semantic steps to reach there, they
take the same time. For the case where one command is a
endif and other is not, because of the assumption that either
both branches contain fall or goto, or neither of them do, the
other command will eventually become endif (during which
L-equivalence is preserved throughout, using Conﬁnement
Lemma)
This completes the proof sketch.